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Abstract 
 
The Euro zone debt crisis has indeed jeopardized the recovery plans 
put in place post global crisis by regulators, policy makers and the sovereigns. 
Though, the crisis is epicentered in the Eurozone, the knock-on effects of the 
crisis are felt all across the globe. The emerging and developing economies 
(EDEs) are also expected to post lower growth on account of worsening 
external environment and a weakening internal demand. This paper while 
presenting the contemporary literature on the topic, analyses the causes for 
sovereign debt crisis and presents the implications of sovereign debt crises and 
draws lessons for banking sectors more particularly in the context of emerging 
markets like that of India.  
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 Euro Zone Debt Crisis: Implications for Indian Banking Sector  
  
1. Introduction 
The euro zone debt crisis
1
, characterized by widespread instabilities has led to a crisis 
of confidence in the global financial markets amid growing market turmoil and the risk of 
contagion as many of the countries in the euro zone are struggling with a combination of high 
levels of indebtedness, budget deficits and frail or deficient growth. In addition, concern 
about the mounting government deficits and alarming debt levels across the globe coupled 
with a wave of downgrading of European governments’ debts has also added to the 
fretfulness in the financial markets. The probability of default on sovereign debt has further 
compounded in congruence with the macro-economic misalignments, which include 
recession-triggered budget deficits, bailout-motivated fiscal measures, as well as country-
specific strategies and political risks. Starting from Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and 
more recently Italy, these euro zone economies have witnessed a severe downgrade in the 
rating of their sovereign debt, fears of default, and a sudden rise in borrowing costs. These 
developments apart from threatening other euro zone economies and even the future of the 
euro have indeed triggered a global debate on the management of sovereign debts and their 
implications on other emerging markets. Given the large economic weight of the euro zone in 
the globe, the contagion of crisis and its potentially devastating effects are necessitating an 
increased attention from the researchers and international financial institutions towards 
analysing the nature and impact of euro zone debt crisis.  
 
The objective of this paper is two-fold: first to analyse the nature and causes of 
sovereign debt crises in the context of euro zone debt crisis and, second to present the 
implications of sovereign debt crises and draw lessons for banking sector. Remainder of this 
                                                          
1 “Aegean Contagion”, is an alternate nomenclature to the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis with reference 
to its point of origin and a general term for an epidemic. 
 paper is structured as follows: Section 2 illustrates the nature, significance, and indicators of 
sovereign debt crises. Section 3 presents the economic impact of sovereign debt crisis from a 
theoretical perspective. Impacts of Euro zone sovereign debt crisis on Indian economy in 
general are analysed in section 4. Implications for banking sector and analysed in section 5 
and finally conclusion is section 6.   
 
2. Nature of Sovereign Debt Crises 
Sovereign debt differs from corporate debt in that it is not enforceable by the courts, 
as a sovereign cannot credibly commit to hand over assets in the event of default. Sovereign 
debt storm erupts when nations and companies act as delinquent individuals and those 
responsible for monitoring them are slumbering on the job (e.g. of debt crises; Russia, 
Argentina, Turkey). Defining a debt crisis as a period of debt-services default for a specific 
country would lead to detecting only a few crises, with the extreme ones corresponding to 
official defaults (Russia 1998, Argentina, 2001). In practice, countries rarely officially 
announce that they are defaulting, since the consequences for their credibility would be 
terrible. According to Moody's Investors Service (2003), only seven rated sovereign bond 
issuers would have defaulted on their foreign currency-denominated bonds since 1985, and 
all those defaults occurred between 1998 and 2002. Sovereign ratings provide an indication 
of the ability and standing of the sovereign governments in servicing their debts.  
 
Sovereign ratings are imperative because not only major issuers in the global capital 
markets are national governments, but also because these appraisals affect the ratings 
assigned to borrowers of the same nationality too. A comparison of the movement of 
sovereign ratings for select economies is presented in table-1. Further, in and figure-1 we 
 present the trend of government debt to GDP of select developed economies and BRIC 
countries. 
Table-1: A comparison of the movement          Figure-1: Government Debt (percent of GDP) 
of Sovereign ratings for select             – Developed economies and BRIC countries 
economies 
 
Source: Compiled by author based on S&P publications           Source: GFSR data of IMF 
 
 
3. Impact of Sovereign Debt Crises 
 The euro zone debt crisis has brought to light that international financial integration 
will not automatically lead to an efficient allocation of capital, as predicted by neoclassical 
theory, and has raised doubts about the ability of free markets to efficiently allocate capital 
(Volz, 2012). Though there have been notable sovereign debt crises, to mention, like the ones 
faced by Russia and Latin American countries during the 1990s, the current euro zone 
sovereign debt crisis is significant in terms of the transition that is taking place globally in the 
geo-political context.  
 
The seminal model of Flood and Garber (1984) provides a theoretical explanation for 
the occurrence of a currency crisis stemming from incoherent macroeconomic policies, and in 
Country 2012 1995 
Australia AAA  AA 
Brazil BBB B+ 
China AA- BBB 
France AA+ AAA 
Germany AAA AAA 
Greece CC BBB 
India BBB BB+ 
Ireland BBB+ AA 
Italy BB AA 
Portugal BB AA- 
Russia BBB  
South Africa BBB BB 
Spain BB AA 
UK BBB AAA 
US AA AAA 
 particular, an uncontrolled monetary expansion, which can be easily extended for monetized 
excessive public deficits (Corsetti and Mackowiak, 2006). On the contrary, only few papers 
have scrutinized the potential mutation of banking crises into sovereign debt ones. However, 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) in their detailed study on the topic, argue that external debt 
surges are an antecedent to banking crises and banking crises are often preceded or 
accompanied by debt crises. In addition, they also observe that public borrowing surges 
ahead of external sovereign default, as governments have “hidden domestic debts” that 
exceed the better documented levels of external debt. Sovereign debt crises impact the cross-
border capital flows and corporate market access (Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003).  
 
The most prominent channel linking sovereign and private sector balance sheets is the 
insolvency of banks. The largest ticking bomb for public balance sheets is the debt of the 
banking sector. Banking crises often develop into sovereign debt crises, or vice versa. Since 
the crisis started in 2008, we have witnessed unprecedented write-down by financial 
institutions and large-scale government bailouts. The collateral damage from banking crises 
spills over to public balance sheets in the form of increasingly unsustainable debts. Given that 
the sovereign debt of the affected countries is present in the balance sheets of banks and 
insurance companies across the world, contagion effects and financial instability could spread 
through the global financial system. The financial crisis has demonstrated that the globalized 
banking system can play a crucial role in transmitting the crisis from the advanced economies 
to various parts of the world, particularly emerging markets. The euro zone debt crisis also 
bears lessons for making a choice on the manner in which foreign banks operating in 
emerging economies should be allowed by the regulators to expand, that is, through the route 
of subsidiaries or through branches. 
 
 The extent of the impact on banks has been broadly in line with the perceived 
deterioration in the credit worthiness of the home sovereign suggesting that investors focus 
on the banks’ jurisdictions as well as their creditworthiness. According to the BIS (2011), 
there are, broadly, four channels through which sovereign risk affect banks’ funding costs, 
given the pervasive role of government debt in the financial system: First, losses associated 
with government debt weaken balance sheets of banks making funding more costly and 
difficult to obtain. Second, higher sovereign risks reduce the value of the collateral that banks 
can use to raise wholesale funding and central bank liquidity. Third, sovereign rating 
downgrades generally flow through to lower ratings for domestic banks, as banks are more 
likely than other sectors to be affected by sovereign distress. As the banks’ credit ratings 
decline, their wholesale funding costs rise. Fourth, a weakening of the sovereign reduces the 
funding benefits that banks could derive from implicit and explicit government guarantees. 
3.1. Debt Crises and Procyclicality 
Financial markets are prone to exaggerations, which in turn add to the pro-cyclicality 
inherent in asset valuations. Typically, during “good times”, (when risk appetite is zealous 
and economic conditions are favorable) asset prices tend to be high and risk spreads tend to 
be low. On the other hand during “bad times” (when the degree of risk aversion heightens 
and GDP growth shrinks), asset prices tend to decline and risk spreads rise. Further, during 
bad times, the procyclicality gets amplified by market exaggerations, as investors tend to 
over-price certain types of risk and thus underpricing the respective financial assets. 
Exaggerated pro-cyclicality of this type has hit the sovereign bond market during the debt 
crisis. Besides, it has exerted severe adverse effects on other segments of financial markets, 
such as the funding markets for banks and financial institutions. Accordingly, the funding 
costs of those Indian banks who were expecting to raise funds from global markets would 
escalate severely though not the liquidity. 
 4. Impact of Sovereign Debt Crisis on Indian Economy 
With the euro zone seeming to head for a recession and the global growth decelerating 
again after a dumpy recovery, growth in India too has toned-down more than that was 
expected earlier. Upsurge in global uncertainty, feeble industrial growth, and slowdown in 
investment activity and deceleration in the resource flow to commercial sector led to dip in 
output growth. Inflation risks emanating from suppressed domestic energy prices, incomplete 
pass-through of rupee depreciation  and slippage in fiscal deficit2, further fuelled by food and 
commodity inflation have led to policy tightening. Europe being one of the largest trading 
blocs for India, the austerity measures by European countries and falling consumer 
expenditures have negatively affected exports, more so services exports from India. 
According to RBI (RBI Monthly Bulletin June 2012), share of India’s exports to euro zone to 
total exports has come down from 20.1 percent in 2009-10 to 18.6 percent in 2010-11 and 
17.5 percent in 2011-12. In view of the weak position of European banks, capital has flown 
back, leading to a sharp depreciation of the Indian Rupee (INR), which is already weak 
(Figure – 2 presents the impact of the crisis on GDP growth and Indian currency).  
Figure – 2: Impact on GDP growth and INR 
 
Source: Changing Contours of Global Crisis – Impact on Indian Economy, RBI Monthly Bulletin April 2012, pp. 725-737 
 
 
                                                          
2 Fiscal position of select economies in the context of euro debt crisis is presented in exhibit-6 
 4.1 Impact on Capital Flows 
Investments into Indian economy have slowed down due to protracted euro zone 
sovereign debt crisis. Foreign direct investment (FDI) to India (excluding 
disinvestments/repatriation) during April-December 2012 at US$ 21.1 billion stood lower as 
compared to the level attained during the corresponding period of previous year (US$ 28.7 
billion). The moderation in FDI to India was recorded under both equity and debt flows. Net 
FDI inflows to India (inward FDI minus outward FDI), however, declined during Q3 of 
2012-13 to US$ 2.5 billion from US$ 5.0 billion in Q3 of 2011-12. Net inflows under 
financial account rose to US$ 31.1 billion during Q3 of 2012-13 (US$ 20.6 billion during Q3 
in previous year). This was mainly on account of net portfolio inflows of US$ 8.6 billion 
during Q3 of 2012-13 as compared with an inflow of US$ 1.8 billion in Q3 of 2011-12 (Table 
– 2). 
 
Table–2: Disaggregated Items of Financial Account 
 
Oct–Dec 
2011   
Oct–Dec 
2012 
Apr–Dec 
2011   
Apr–Dec 
2012 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to India 6.9 4.8 28.7 21.1 
FDI into India – Financial Services 2.4 2.2 - - 
FDI into India – Business Services 1.3 0.5 - - 
Loans to India 8.1 7.2 15.7 14.4 
External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) -0.8 3.1 6.9 4.7 
Loans by India - ECB 0.5 -0.1 1.2 -0.2 
Reserve Assets 12.8 -0.8 7.1 -1.1 
 Note:       Figures in (US$ Billion) 
 Source:    Developments in India's Balance of Payments during Third Quarter (October-December) of 2012-13,  
RBI Monthly Bulletin June 2013. Available at www.rbi.org.in   
 
Net external loans availed by banks stood at US$ 2.7 billion in Q3 of 2012-13 as against 
outflows of US$ 8.7 billion in Q3 of 2011-12 mainly due to drawing down of Nostro 
balances and higher overseas borrowings by the banks. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table – 3: Sector-wise FDI Inflows 
FDI into India Apr–Dec 2011   Apr–Dec 2012 
Financial Services 2.4 2.2 
Business Services 1.3 0.5 
Communication Services 1.5 0.1 
Manufacture 8.0 4.8 
Electricity and other 1.0 1.0 
Computer services 0.5 0.2 
Construction 1.7 1.0 
Restaurants and Hotels 0.7 3.1 
Others 2.1 1.0 
Total 19.2 13.9 
Note:       Figures in (US$ Billion) 
  Source:    Developments in India's Balance of Payments during Third Quarter  
(October-December) of 2012-13, RBI Monthly Bulletin June 2013. 
Available at www.rbi.org.in     
 
Sector-wise, the decline in FDI inflows during the period was mainly in case of 
manufacturing, financial services, business services and communication services (Table 3).  
 
5. Implications for Banking Sector 
In the run up to the crisis, the eurozone experienced strong credit booms as the euro 
banks could easily borrow from international financial markets in their own currency – euro. 
Further, with lower interest rates and easy credit availability stimulated the consumption and 
mortgage borrowing (Fagan and Gaspar, 2007). This led to sharp shooting up of the domestic 
credit levels in the euro zone. Figure 6 illustrates the growth of domestic credit in select euro 
zone countries viz., Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Sweden. One of the key 
predictors of a banking crisis is the scale of the domestic credit preceding the boom 
(Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012). There was a sudden upshot in the dispersion of domestic 
credit and heating up of current account deficits during 2003-07 though not during the onset 
of euro in 1999. (Lane and Pels, 2012; Lane and McQuade, 2012). 
  
 
Figure – 6: Growth of domestic credit in Euro zone 
 
 Note:     The figure captures domestic credit to private sector (percent of GDP) select Euro zone countries 
 Source:  The figure is developed based on the data sourced from World Development Indicators  
              of Data Bank of the World Bank 
 
The crisis has posed serious challenges for the banking sector. Deficient policy 
actions and not enough reforms of the banking sector have left segments of the global 
banking system vulnerable to further shocks. Many institutions—particularly weaker 
European banks—are caught in a maelstrom of interlinked pressures that are intensifying 
risks for the system as a whole (Figure-4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure-4: Banking sector challenges 
 
   Source: Designed by the author 
 
 
In order to address the challenges posed by the debt crises the affected countries could 
consider some of the solutions like:  (i) restructuring the portfolios of the banks to strengthen 
the tail, (ii) providing policy clarity on the private sector bail-ins to address the investor 
concerns, (iii) reducing the reliance on short-term wholesale funding to relieve the funding 
pressures, (iv) introducing rigorous stress tests and transparency in governance mechanisms 
to address to the asset quality concerns, (v) tightening fiscal consolidation and being prudent 
in macro-economic management than populist to address the sovereign risks, and (v) infusing 
the enough quality capital to address leverage concerns (refer Figure-5). 
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Figure-5: Banking sector challenges – Suggested measures 
 
Source: Designed by the author 
 
  
 
The worries about Europe’s banks have been teeming in the background for some 
time as inadequately capitalized banks were holding up poorly financed governments, which 
in turn are expected to support those banks. After a brief lull reflecting the hefty liquidity 
injection by the European Central Bank (ECB), concerns have again arisen about a 
sustainable solution to the sovereign debt crisis and the escalating vulnerability of the 
banking sector. Heightened risk aversion and the ensuing decline in capital flows will have an 
adverse impact on emerging economies including India. For the emerging markets like China 
and India, Europe and the euro zone accounts for a significant market. Therefore, stagnation 
or a downturn in the euro zone will undoubtedly dent their export growth. While the for the 
Chinese – who are looking for opportunities to make bargains during the fire sale of assets, 
the euro zone debt crisis poses both – the threats as well as opportunities, however, for India 
– for whom EU is a major trade partner accounting for almost 20% of India’s exports and 
13% of imports. India. This apart FDI from EU during 2010 amounted to €3.0 billion while 
 India invested about €0.6 billion in the EU. Per se, a slowdown in the euro zone and the EU is 
likely to have a major adverse impact on India’s exports. Exhibit-2 presents the India’s 
external debt position and its debt-service ratio. Exhibit-5 captures the Government of India’s 
overall debt position. 
 
5.1 Implications for Indian Banking Sector 
Though trade channel is the dominant channel of transmission of the euro crisis 
contagion to India, but there will be negative spillovers on India’s financial sector as well. 
Aizenman et al. (2012) assessing the likelihood of financial contagion from the eurozone to 
Asian financial markets using event study have traced the impact of distinct eurozone news 
on the dynamics of equity and bond prices in developing countries.   
 
In general, eurozone has been a vital source of foreign bank loans for developing 
Asia. The conflux of funding strains and sovereign risks led to fears of a precipitous 
deleveraging process that could hurt financial markets and the wider economy via asset sales 
and contractions in credit. Many European banks have announced medium term business 
plans for reducing assets. The impact is likely to differ significantly across regions, with 
larger effects expected in emerging Europe than in Asia or Latin America. In the Indian 
context, the claims of European banks, amounting to US$ 146 billion, formed 53 per cent of 
total consolidated foreign claims. Of this, 56 per cent pertained to claims of banks in United 
Kingdom. According to data from the Bank for International Settlements, in September 2011 
India’s borrowings from eurozone banks amounted to around $ 57 billion. While share of 
borrowings from eurozone in total foreign bank borrowings was to the extent of 17.9 percent, 
borrowings from Eurozone banks as share of domestic credit was at 4.4 percent. 
 
  
Indian banking system has not been notably impacted by the euro debt crisis as 
neither does it have any significant presence in countries impacted by the current crisis nor 
Indian banks have any significant exposures to bonds issued by them. Though there is no 
first-order impact of the sovereign debt crisis, there could however, be second-order impact 
through various channels including trade. There could be funding constraints for Indian bank 
branches operating overseas if European banks deleverage. The cost of borrowing for banks 
and corporates, as a result, may go up leading to concerns over refinancing foreign currency 
liabilities. Due to the slump in the overseas demand and the associated downturn in 
investment activity, there has already been some sluggishness in the credit as well as asset 
growth of Indian banking sector during 2011-12. 
 
The direct impact of the Eurozone crisis on Indian banks is expected to be limited as 
the Indian banking sector is largely dominated by domestic banks with foreign banks 
accounting for only 8 per cent of total banking sector assets and 5 per cent of banking sector 
credit. However, there could be indirect impact on Indian banks due to their exposures to 
other countries, especially in the Eurozone. Further, though the direct impact of deleveraging 
is not expected to be significant on domestic credit availability, there definitely would be an 
impact on specialized types of financing like structured long-term finance, project finance 
and trade finance could be impacted. 
 
According to RBI data, at the end of September 2011, there are only 37 branches and 
3 subsidiaries of Indian banks in the European Union, and none of them is in Portugal, Italy, 
Greece and Spain. Out of the 37 branches, 30 branches are in the UK, 3 branches in Belgium 
and 2 each in Germany and France. All of the three subsidiaries are in the UK. Their 
 combined share in the aggregate banking sector assets stood at 3 per cent as at end September 
2011. Moreover, none of the Indian banks has any exposure to bonds issued by Portugal, 
Greece and Spain while exposures to Italian bonds are insignificant. 
 
One significant lesson from the euro debt crises for Indian financial system that is 
relatively more open than that of Chinese. For example, wholesale debt funding has been the 
undoing for banks in the euro zone. Though it is hard to argue that banks should only raise 
debt resources through retail deposits, at the same time, the current episode shows that large-
scale reliance on wholesale debt, specifically, from across borders can tilt the financial 
stability. Of course, though the Indian banking system has conventionally relied on retail 
deposits, which despite higher cost serve as a stable source of funding, any substantial shift 
towards wholesale debt funding may not be a desired. The second important inference, we 
can draw from the euro debt crisis is that India’s continuance of making the banks hold the 
public debt (due to its high fiscal deficit) hitherto as a vestige of the era of financial 
repression may not hold prudent all the time as the euro debt crisis raises the question of 
whether sovereign debt of a country can be held largely outside a country in portfolios that 
keep getting churned and subject to day to day re-pricing. While exhibit-3 presents the 
amount of investments in T-Bills of the Government of India by the Indian banks, Exhibit-4 
captures the investments of Indian banks in the government securities. 
 
Sovereign debt crises have far-reaching consequences and usually go hand in hand 
with (or can be traced to) banking and – in many cases – currency crises. Hence, managing 
and resolving sovereign debt crises pose unexpected challenges to policymakers. Crucial 
actions and reforms have been taken over the past two years to tackle the current European 
debt crisis. However, given their numerous transmission channels, these measures have been 
 the subject of intense debate among decision-makers, experts, the media, and the general 
public. Though the euro zone sovereign debt crisis can impact Indian economy through five 
broad channels such as; banking sector, commodity markets, currency markets, investments 
and trade, this paper has focused exclusively on the implications for the banking sector, as the 
banking sector in view of all pervasive nature interacts with all the other channels too. 
 
 
The global financial crisis and the current euro zone crisis have severely impacted the 
banking sectors in the advanced economies and the spillover is ricocheting on banks in 
emerging economies including India. Indian banking sector has not been impacted by euro 
zone debt crisis, as it does not have any substantial presence in euro zone countries nor Indian 
banking sector has any significant exposures to bonds issued by them. Though there is no 
first order impact of the euro zone debt crisis, there could, however, be second-order impact 
through various channels including trade. There could be funding constraints for Indian bank 
branches operating overseas if European banks deleverage. The cost of borrowing for Indian 
banks and corporates has shoot up leading to concerns over refinancing foreign currency 
liabilities. Owing to the drop in the overseas demand and the associated downturn in 
investment activity, there has already been some sluggishness in the credit as well as asset 
growth of Indian banking sector. 
  
Consequent to the European banks suffering huge losses and liquidity constraints, the 
supply of foreign credit to emerging markets has dried up which has added to the pressure on 
investing spending in emerging markets which are already struggling to cope with rising 
capital costs due to tight monetary policies. India is experiencing similar situation and the 
Indian banks are forced to look inward and explore domestic sources of capital though 
relatively to costlier to compensate for the shrinking global market. As European banks 
 suffered due to the sovereign debt crisis, capital has flown back, leading to a sharp 
depreciation of the rupee, which was already weak. A falling rupee has hurt the industries and 
their profit margins both within and outside the country. This has negatively affected the 
profitability and credit deployment activity of the banking sector. 
 
5.2 Impact on foreign claims on Indian banks 
In view of the prolonged euro zone debt crisis, net external loans availed by banks 
stood at US$ 2.7 billion in third quarter (Q3) of 2012-13 as against outflows of US$ 8.7 
billion in Q3 of 2011-12. Similarly, the consolidated claims of foreign banks on India have 
experienced a gradual decline due to the impact of the crisis (Table-4). Particularly on the 
Indian banks, the outstanding consolidated claims of the foreign banks have experienced a 
negative change of 2.22 percent i.e., from US $ 83,553 mn in End-September 2011 to US $ 
81,731 mn in End-September 2012.   
Table – 4: Consolidated claims of reporting banks – immediate borrower basis 
on India by maturity and sector 
(Amounts outstanding figures in millions of US dollars) 
 Total 
foreign 
claims on a 
contractual 
basis 
 
 
(A+L) 
Consolidated cross-border claims in all currencies and local claims 
in non-local currencies 
Total 
Internation
al Claims 
 
 
(A) 
Maturities Sectors 
Upto and 
including 
One year 
 
(B) 
Over One 
year and 
upto two 
years 
(C) 
Over 
two 
years 
 
(D) 
 
 
Banks 
 
(E) 
 
Public 
sector 
 
(F) 
End-September 
2011 
320,914 224,460 139,213 12,311 51,892 83,553 10,632 
End-September 
2012 
331,902 234,763 139,515 11,598 57,739 81,731 10,530 
Percentage 
change 
3.4 4.5 0.2 - 5.79 11.26 - 2.22 - 0.96 
Source: BIS Quarterly Review, March 2012 and BIS Quarterly Review, March 2013 
  
Further, the external positions of foreign banks on India (according to BIS statistics) have 
nosedived from US $ 36,987 mn in December 2010 to US $ 32,194 mn in December 2011, 
US $ 30,092 mn in June 2012 and US $ 29,515 mn in September 2012. 
  
On a comparison of the consolidated foreign claims and other exposures of foreign 
banks on ultimate risk basis on India by sector type, we find that, consolidated cross border 
claims on the Indian banks experienced downward trend with a negative growth of 3.15 
percent with the outstanding level of US $ 75,413 mn in end-September 2011 to US $ 73,039 
mn in end-September 2012 (Table–5). Similarly, the exposures under derivatives contracts 
have nosedived to negative growth of 30.98 percent. Guarantees extended have experienced a 
fall of 19.45 percent and the credit commitments have declined by 24.60 percent.  
Table – 5: Consolidated foreign claims and other exposures of reporting banks – 
ultimate risk basis on India by sector and type 
(Amounts outstanding figures in millions of US dollars) 
 
Consolidated cross border and local claims in 
all currencies 
Other exposures (not 
included in Foreign 
Claims) 
Total 
foreign 
claims of 
24 
countries 
Of which on Of 
which 
cross-
border 
claims 
 
Deriva
tives 
contra
cts 
 
Guara
ntees 
extend
ed 
Credit 
comm
itment
s 
Banks Public 
Sector 
Non-
bank 
private 
sector 
End-September 
2011 
283,645 75,413 32,033 176,039 174,439 17,594 42,465 54,576 
End-September 
2012 
287,707 73,039 37,614 176,838 174,124 12,143 34,202 41,153 
Percentage 
change 
1.43 - 3.15 17.42 0.45 - 0.18 - 30.98 - 19.45 - 24.60 
Source: BIS Quarterly Review, March 2012 and BIS Quarterly Review, March 2013 
 
 
 
Our observation that euro zone sovereign debt crisis has impacted on the Indian banking 
sector further stands supported by the fact that there has been a significant fall in the claims 
of the euro zone banks on India. Table – 6 presented here below depicts the consolidated 
foreign claims on India of the foreign banks based on their country of origin. Claims of 
European banks on India came down from US $ 13,354 in end-September 2011 to US $ 
12,362 mn in end-September 2012, thus experiencing a downfall of 7.54 percent. Most of the 
foreign claims from countries like Italy, Ireland, Denmark, France, Luxemburg, Cyprus, 
Norway and Netherlands have drastically come down during the crisis period.   
  
Table – 6: Consolidated foreign claims of reporting banks  
- ultimate risk basis on India 
                                                                                                   (Amounts outstanding figures in millions of US dollars) 
 
End-September 
2011 
End-September 
2012 
Percentage 
change 
All countries 44581 46198 3.62 
Developed Countries 27108 26122 - 3.64 
Other Developed 
Countries 
13754 13760 0.04 
Developing Countries 8735 9498 8.73 
Offshore centers 7965 9500 19.27 
Europe 13354 12362 - 7.54 
Belgium 969 1122 15.78 
Cyprus 197 183 - 7.10 
Denmark 99 85 - 14.14 
Finland 45 41 - 8.88 
France 964 762 - 20.95 
Germany 2461 2077 - 15.60 
Ireland 258 71 - 72.48 
Italy 233 160 - 31.33 
Luxembourg 161 58 - 63.97 
Malta 275 1 - 99.63 
Netherlands 1468 1276 - 13.07 
Norway 101 17 - 83.16 
Portugal 32 34 6.25 
Spain 109 125 14.67 
Switzerland 684 714 4.38 
United Kingdom 5172 5361 8.87 
Source: BIS Quarterly Review, March 2012 and BIS Quarterly Review, March 2013 
 
 
 
5.3 Impact on Syndicated credit facilities 
We also analyse the trend of the international syndicated credit facilities by India for the 
period from 2010 to 2012 in order to discern the impact of the euro zone sovereign debt 
crisis. We observe that international syndicated credit facilities for India have slipped down 
from US $ 33.6 bn in 2010 to US $ 32.9 bn in 2011 and US $ 25.0 bn in 2012 (see Figure–3).  
 
 
 
        Figure – 3: Signed international syndicated credit facilities by India 
 
Source: BIS Quarterly Review, March 2012 and BIS Quarterly Review, March 2013 
 
This reduced activity under syndicated credit facilities has dampened the fund raising 
scenario for the Indian banks, financial institutions, and institutional investors. 
 
5.4 Impact on Portfolio Investments in India 
There has been a steady slide in the portfolio investments in India due to the impact of the 
euro zone sovereign debt crisis. We find in our analysis that, portfolio investments in India 
(according to RBI Monthly Bulletin June 2011 and June 2013) came down from US $ 32,376 
mn in 2009-10 to US $ 31,471 to 2010-11 (Figure–4) and came further down to US $ 27,264 
mn in 2012-13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure – 4: Portfolio Investments in India 
33.6 32.9
25
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2009-10 2010-11 2012-13
U
S 
$
 m
n
 
   Source: Data sourced from RBI Monthly Bulletin June 2011 and June 2013 
 
 
Euro zone debt crisis, apart from its negative impact on portfolio investments capital inflows, 
could also affect the European involvement in the merger and acquisitions (M&A) activities 
in Indian corporate sector. With the Euro zone remaining sluggish, the appetite of European 
companies for M&A in India has declined. 
 
6. Conclusion 
When banking markets are closely integrated, each individual country is de facto 
responsible for preserving the stability of the entire international financial system. As Bolton 
and Jeanne (2011) rightly observed that by maintaining a sound fiscal position, each country 
provides a public good to all other countries. The recent financial crisis has demonstrated that 
the globalised banking system played a key role in transmitting the crisis from the advanced 
economies to other parts of the world, including the emerging economies. Euro debt crisis 
also holds lessons for making a prudent choice on the manner in which foreign banks should 
be allowed to expand in emerging economies, i.e,. whether through the route of subsidiaries 
or through branches. This study has analysed the causes and consequences of euro debt crisis 
on the emerging markets’ banking sectors in general and Indian banking sector in particular, 
 in the light of the widely believed argument that bank exposure to sovereign debts and the 
weak economy are perpetuating financial sector fragility, which in turn is spurring continued 
deleveraging. It is suggested that the emerging markets need to strengthen their firewalls to 
protect themselves from the ill effects of euro debt crises.  
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Exhibit-1: Euro zone debt crisis – A timeline of events 
Oct 09 Greek prime minister George Papandreou discloses the country’s severe fiscal problems in 
his first parliamentary speech. 
Nov 09 The Greek government reveals a revised budget deficit of 12.7% of GDP for 2009, double 
the previous estimate. 
Jan 10 The European Commission publishes a report criticizing the Greek budget deficit. 
Feb 10 Euro zone leaders promise to provide financial support to Greece if it reduces its fiscal 
deficit. 
Apr 10 Standard & Poor’s downgrades Greece (to BB+) and Portugal (to A-), with Spain 
downgraded (to AA) on the following day. 
May 10 The Greek government accepts the €110 billion EU-IMF support package. The Spanish 
parliament approves a fiscal austerity package. Fitch downgrades Spain to AA+. 
Jun 10 The Portuguese parliament approves a fiscal austerity package. 
Spain’s Council of Ministers approves the labour market reform. 
The European Council announces that the EU bank stress test results will be published. 
In Italy, union rallies force the government to redraft its fiscal austerity package. 
Jul 10 The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) releases the results of the EU 
bank stress tests. 
Oct 10 The French and German governments agree to take steps that would make it possible to 
impose haircuts on euro area sovereign bonds. A European Council statement makes it clear 
that other EU governments have agreed to the proposal on government bond haircuts. 
Nov 10 The Irish prime minister announces that the government has requested financial support 
from the European Union and the IMF. The Irish government accepts a €68 billion EU-IMF 
support package 
Mar 11 
 
Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates resigns when opposition politicians reject his 
proposed austerity budget. Portuguese government bond yields rise to unsustainable levels 
as Fitch and Standard & Poor’s cut their ratings of Portuguese sovereign debt. 
May 11 European leaders approve a €78 billion ($110 billion) bailout package for Portugal on the 
condition that Portuguese officials implement a series of austerity measures. 
June 11 Standard & Poor’s downgrades Greece’s credit rating to CCC, making it the country with 
the world’s lowest-rated sovereign debt. 
July 11 Unimpressed with Portugal’s recovery in the wake of the May 2011 bailout package, 
Moody’s rating agency lowers the country’s debt rating to junk status. 
Sept 11 
 
Switzerland, a non-EU country surrounded by euro-zone economies, has watched its 
currency, the franc, appreciate dramatically against the struggling euro. With export and 
tourism revenues falling, the Swiss National Bank stuns the international currency market 
by devaluing the franc and pegging its value to that of the euro. 
Jan 12 Standard & Poor’s downgrades nine euro-zone countries, stripping France and Austria of 
their AAA ratings and classifying the debts of Portugal and Cyprus as junk. This makes 
Portugal the second European country (after Greece) to have its debt downgraded to non-
investment status by all three ratings agencies. Portuguese 10-year-bond yields skyrocket in 
response to the news, eventually reaching a euro-era record 18.29 percent. 
Mar 12 On March 2, 25 EU countries sign the new pact on fiscal discipline. While it will be 
binding only for those countries that use the euro, the other signatories can choose to abide 
by its guidelines.  
Jun 12 On June 9, the Spanish government requests €100 billion (about $125 billion) in financial 
 assistance from the EU to recapitalize its banks. 
July 12 Spanish 10-year bond yields again top 7 percent, while yields of German and Austrian 2-
year bonds drop to below zero. German, Austrian, French, and Belgian borrowing costs 
reach historic lows as investors seek a safe financial haven at the core of the euro area. 
 Source: Compiled by the author  
 
 
Exhibit-2 
 
  Source: Data sourced from RBI database 
 
Exhibit-3 
 
  Source: Data sourced from RBI database 
 
Exhibit-4 
  
  Source: Data sourced from RBI database 
 
 
 
Exhibit-5: Government of India’s debt position 
Year 
Domestic 
Liabilities 
of the 
Centre 
External 
Liabilities 
of the 
Centre 
Year 
Domestic 
Liabilities 
of the 
Centre 
External 
Liabilities 
of the 
Centre 
1980-81    33.33 7.77 1996-97    45.08 3.93 
1981-82    32.70 7.22 1997-98    47.34 3.62 
1982-83    37.26 7.16 1998-99    47.66 3.27 
1983-84    36.02 6.80 1999-00    49.31 2.99 
1984-85    38.84 6.67 2000-01    52.45 3.14 
1985-86    42.42 6.45 2001-02    56.82 3.14 
1986-87    46.45 6.45 2002-03    61.09 2.43 
1987-88    48.16 6.49 2003-04    61.37 1.67 
1988-89    48.06 6.06 2004-05    59.64 1.88 
1989-90    49.18 5.81 2005-06    58.64 2.55 
1990-91    49.69 5.53 2006-07    56.72 2.39 
1991-92    48.53 5.64 2007-08    54.65 2.25 
1992-93    47.79 5.62 2008-09    53.93 2.19 
1993-94    49.74 5.47 2009-10    52.59 2.08 
1994-95    48.01 5.01 2010-11    49.19 2.04 
1995-96    46.57 4.30 2011-12    46.92 1.92 
Source: RBI database 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit-6: Fiscal position of select economies in the context of euro debt crisis 
 
 Source: Compiled by the author from World Economic Outlook updates of IMF 
Country Fiscal and Debt Fundamentals 
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 held  
abroad 
  
Domestic depository institutions’ 
claims on general government BIS 
reporting 
banks’ 
consolidated 
international 
claims on 
public sector 
Rating/Outlook 
(notches above 
speculative  
grade/outlook)  
(as of 3/10/11) 
Five-year 
(basis 
points) 
(as of 
3/9/11) 
(percent of 
2010 GDP) 
  
  
 
(percent of 2010 GDP) 
(percent of depository 
institutions’ consolidated 
assets) 
2011 2012 
Australia  24.1 7.8 –2.1 4.5 3.3 43.4 2.2 1.2 3.2 9 Stable 51 
Canada  84.2 35.1 –4.1 18.5 16.4 19.6 19.6 10.3 3.6 10 Stable n.a. 
Denmark  45.6 4.4 –3.2 9.3 9.8 41.8 15.5 3.2 6 10 Stable 44 
France  87.6 77.9 –3.5 20.6 19.7 64.4 19 4.7 8.8 10 Stable 85 
Germany  80.1 54.7 –0.3 11.4 10.5 52.8 25.4 7.6 10.4 10 Stable 48 
Greece  152.3 n.a. –0.9 24 26 61.5 27.4 12.2 23.3 –1 negative 1,037 
Ireland  114.1 95.2 –7.5 19.5 18 59.4 28.2 2.8 8.7 3 negative 587 
Italy  120.3 100.6 0.2 22.8 23.1 47 32.1 13.1 15.2 7 Stable 180 
Japan  229.1 127.8 –8.6 55.8 52.5 6.9 76.3 23.7 1.6 7 negative 77 
Korea  28.8 27.5 3.5 8.9 5.8 11.5 6.1 4.4 4.8 5 Stable 98 
Netherlands  65.6 30.5 –2.2 19.9 16.6 66.4 13.8 3.6 9.2 10 Stable 47 
Portugal 90.6 86.3 –1.6 21.6 21 56.7 15.7 4.8 17.2 5 negative 498 
Spain  63.9 52.6 –4.6 19.3 18.7 49.6 22.3 6.8 7.1 8 negative 253 
Sweden  37.3 –13.8 –0.9 5.4 4.6 45.2 6.5 2.3 5.3 10 Stable 33 
UK 83 75.1 –5.5 15.7 13.6 26.8 6.9 1.5 2.9 10 Stable 58 
USA 99.5 72.4 –9.0 28.8 25.6 31.9 7.7 5.3 3.7 10 Stable 43 
